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The future, of course, will bring new problems and unexpected
complications. It is believed, however, that if the purposes of
these carefully drafted penal and injunctive provisions are borne
in mind, and subtle, exculpatory distinctions are not permitted
to develop, these vital problems under the Act will remain rela-
tively simple.
MoRRIs JACK GARDEN.
RADIO DEFAMATION -LIBEL OR SLANDER?
Homines qui gestant, quique auseultant crimina,
Si meo arbitratu liceat, omnes pendeant,
Gestores linguis, auditores auribus.1
Plautus Pseudolus I. 5. 12
I
A survey of the modern law of libel and slander will expose
the scars wrought by time in the visage of defamation. The
sixteenth and early seventeeth centuries witnessed the develop-
ment of slander as a tort through the action on the case.2 Juris-
tic attempts to discourage the action on the case, however, re-
sulted in certain defects in the law of slander. In order to remedy
these defects, judicial fecundity produced the law of libel in the
latter part of the seventeenth century.3 The cases, as they arose,
were decided not on general or theoretical grounds, but rather
for reasons which seemed most expedient and sufficient to the
judges at the time to dispose of the particular case in hand. 4
In their development libel and slander were not scientifically
cultivated. Theirs was a haphazard growth influenced by the
events of each century, such as the widespread employment of
printing. Important political developments of the eighteenth
century resulted in a somewhat clear-cut division of the tort of
defamation into libel and slander. This division has formed a
good starting point for the development of, and a satisfactory
framework for, the many detailed rules made necessary by the
nineteenth century methods of communications.2
The twentieth century is witnessing the development of a new
1. Your tittle tattlers, and those who listen to slander, by my good will
should all be hanged-the former by their tongues, the latter by their ears.
2. 8 Holdsworth, History of English Law (1926) 367.
3. Ibid.
4. 8 Holdsworth, History of English Law (1926) 362.
5. 8 Holdsworth, History of English Law (1926) 378.
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medium of publicity. Radio communication today furnishes a
new instrument for the ancient art of defamation.6 It is a power-
ful weapon for "character destruction.' 7 While the legal theories
underlying rights and liabilities are well defined," their applica-
tion to this novel situation is not clear-cut. Once more a new
invention is serving as a stimulus to the growth of the law of
libel and slander.
Defamation is generally defined as a false publication 9 calcu-
lated to bring a person into disrepute. 0 If the defamatory publi-
cation be written or the object of the sense of sight, then it is
libel. If it is oral or the object of the sense of hearing, then it
is slander." There are, however, some cases holding that the
reading aloud of libelous matter is the publication of a libel.1 2
Inasmuch as a libel is said to be anything defamatory that is the
object of the sense of sight, it need not necessarily be in writing
or printed.13 A picture," effigy,15 or statue," or any other sign
or mark exposed to view,1 if it suggests a defamatory meaning,
6. Davis, Law of Radio (1927) 157.
7. Ibid.
8. 8 Holdsworth, History of English Law (1926) 378.
9. Cooley, Torts (4th ed. 1932) 451; Newell, Slander and Libel (4th ed.
1924) 218; "Publication is the communication of the defamatory words to
some person or persons other than the person defamed." Odgers, Libel and
Slander (6th ed. 1929) 131. Publication to a third person is unnecessary in
Scotland. Either oral or written defamatory statements, affecting the indi-
vidual to whom they are addressed will be the basis of an action for dam-
ages at his instance even though no third person has heard or read them.
5 Encyclopedia of the Laws of Scotland, Defamation (1928) 484, sec. 1103,
citing Mackay v. M'Cankie (1883) 10 R. 537 (Court of Session Cases, 4th
Series).
10. Newell, Slander and Libel (4th ed. 1924) 1; Cooley, To'rts (4th ed.
1932) 451.
11. Ibid.
12. Davis, Radio Law (1927) 159; De Libellis Formosis, 5 Coke Rep. 125,
6 Eng. Rep. 250, held that publication may be "Verbis aut cantilenis, as
when the libel is maliciously repeated or sung in the presence of others";
Lamb's Case, 9 Coke's Rep. 59b, 6 Eng. Rep. 822; Forrester v. Tyrell (1893)
57 J. P. 532, 9 T. L. R. 257; M'Coombs v. Tuttle (Ind. 1840) 5 Blackf. 431;
Ohio Public Service Co. v. Myers (1934) 54 Ohio App. 40.
13. Odgers, Libel and Slander (6th ed. 1929) 21.
14. Du Bost v. Beresford (1810) 2 Camp. 511, 170 Eng. Rep. 1235;
Cassidy v. Daily Mirror Newspapers (1929) 2 K. B. 331, 98 L. J. K. B.
595; Moley v. Barager (1890) 77 Wis. 43, 45 N. W. 1082; Farley v. Evening
Chronicle Pub. Co. (1905) 113 Mo. App. 216, 87 S. W. 565; Munden v.
Harris (1911) 153 Mo. App. 652, 134 S. W. 1076; Ball v. Evening Ameri-
can Pub. Co. (1908) 237 Ill. 592, 86 N. E. 1097; Peck v. Tribune Co. (1909)
214 U. S. 185, 29 S. Ct. 554, 53 L. ed. 960.
15. Jeffries v. Duncombe (1809) 11 East. 226, 103 Eng. Rep. 991; Monson
v. Tussauds, Ltd. (1894) 1 Q. B. 671, 63 L. J. Q. B. 454; Johnson v. Com-
monwealth (1888) 10 Sad. (Pa.) 514, 14 Atl. 425.
16. Monson v. Tussauds, Ltd. (1894) 1 Q. B. 671, 63 L. J. Q. B. 454.
17. Jeffries v. Duncombe (1809) 11 East. 226, 103 Eng. Rep. 991.
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may be a libel. 18 The basic reasons for the distinction between
libel and slander are: (1) that written matter implies greater
deliberation than vocal utterances; (2) that written defamation
is more generally propagated; and (3) that written matter is
more permanent in form' 9-- "Vox emissa volat; literm scripta
manet'"2 -- The problem of radio defamation is one in which the
elements of libel and slander are both present .2 It is the purpose
of this note to determine whether or not radio defamation can
unequivocally be held to be libel or slander.
II
The question was recently raised in the case of Locke v. Gib-
bons.22 The alleged defamation occurred during a broadcast over
Radio Station W.L.W. of Cincinnati, Ohio, by the defendant,
Floyd Gibbons, of the disastrous Ohio Valley Flood of January,
1937. The plaintiff alleged that he, as a professional news re-
porter, prepared the script for the defendant's broadcast. He
further alleged that during the actual broadcast the defendant
deliberately injected certain misstatements of fact for the pur-
pose of creating melodramatic effects.
The alleged failure of the defendant to attribute the misstate-
ments of fact to himself and his express reference to the plain-
tiff's authorship of the material broadcasted was the basis of the
plaintiff's claim that he was damaged in his reputation as an
accurate news reporter and that he lost valuable employment
as a writer for radio broadcasts. Because the facts of the case
were limited to an "ad-libbed" broadcast, Pecora, J. held that the
alleged words, if actionable at all, were actionable as slander.
The only other case expressly holding radio defamation to be
18. Supra, note 12; Fey v. King (1922) 194 Iowa 835, 190 N. W. 519;
Moley v. Barager (1890) 77 Wis. 43, 45 N. W. 1082; Randall v. Evening
News Ass'n (1890) 79 Mich. 266, 44 N. W. 783, 7 L. R. A. 309.
19. Cooley, Torts, (4th ed. 1932) 488-489; Lord Mansfield in Thorley v.
Lord Kerry (1812) 4 Taunt. 355, 128 Eng. Rep. 367, 371, said: "It is
argued that written scandal is more generally diffused than words spoken,
and is therefore actionable; but an assertion made in a public place, as
upon the Royal Exchange, concerning a merchant in London, may be much
more extensively diffused than a few printed papers dispersed, or a private
letter; it is true that a newspaper may be very generally read, but that
is all casual. These are the arguments which prevail on my mind to repudi-
ate the distinction between written and spoken scandal."
20. Odgers, Libel and Slander (6th ed. 1929) 4.
21. Lowe, J. in Meldrum v. Australian Broadcasting Co., Ltd. (1932)
Victoria Law Rep. 425, 442 said-"In my opinion 'Libel,' and 'Slander,'
and 'Publication' are not to be treated as unrelated concepts. The true view
is that 'publication of libel' and 'publication of slander' are composite no-
tions, in which the precise shade of meaning to be attached to the 'publi-
cation' is colored by its association with the rest of the phrase."
22. (1937) 299 N. Y. S. 188.
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slander is that of Meldrum v. Australian Broadcasting Com-
pany.23 The reasoning upon which the decision is based is that
the pleadings failed to show that the radio audience knew at the
time of the broadcast that the speaker was reading libelous mat-
ter from the script.2 4 Such lack of knowledge on the part of the
radio listeners meant that the publication could not be considered
anything but the publication of a slander.
2 5
These two cases are not in accord with Sorensen v. Wood 6
which seems to have been the first case to reach an appellate
court on this issue. During the course of a political campaign,
Radio Station K.F.A.B., a co-defendant, allowed Wood to read
a written speech he had prepared defaming the character of
Sorensen. Station K.F.A.B. did not require a copy of the speech
before the broadcast and made no attempt to cut Wood off the
air. The Supreme Court of Nebraska, in holding the defendant
liable for unprivileged defamatory utterances, said that defama-
tion by radio should be treated as libel rather than slander, at
least where the broadcast is one in which the defamatory matter
is read from a script.
Other cases reaching the appellate courts of the United States
have found it unnecessary to label radio defamation unequivocally
as libel or slander. The Supreme Court of Washington held in
the case of Miles v. Wasmer"27 that since the substance of the
language complained of in the broadcast was slanderous per se,
it was unnecessary to decide whether it constituted libel or
slander.
Although the United States District Court, Western District
of Missouri, on motion, remanded the case of Coffey v. Midland
Broadcasting Company2 8 to the state court on a technical point
23. Meldrum v. Australian Broadcasting Co., Ltd. (1932) Vict. L. R. 425.
24. Lowe, J. in Meldrum v. Australian Broadcasting Co. (1932) Vict.
L. R. 425, pointed out that publication in relation to a libel requires the
conveying to the mind of a third person, not merely the defamatory matter,
but also the permanent form in which it is expressed and recorded. The
court refused to apply Forrester v. Tyrell (1893) 9 T. L. R. 257 partially
for the reason that the audience in that case knew that the publisher was
reading libelous matter aloud from a written paper.
25. Quaere: Would the Supreme Court of Victoria hold radio defamation
to be slander in some future case where the pleadings might show that the
defendant broadcast defamatory matter verbatim from a written script and
the radio audience knew that he was reading the libelous matter aloud?
26. (1932) 123 Neb. 348, 243 N. W. 82, 82 A. L. R. 1098; In K F A B
Broadcasting Co. v. Sorensen (1933) 290 U. S. 599, 54 S. Ct. 209, 78 L. ed.
527, an appeal to the Supreme Court of the U. S. was refused for the
reason that the judgment of the state court sought to be reviewed was
based upon a non-federal ground adequate to support it.
27. (1933) 172 Wash. 466, 20 P. (2d) 847.
28. (D. C. W. D. Mo. 1934) 8 F. Supp. 889.
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of jurisdiction, it, nevertheless, contained sufficient dicta to fore-
cast that in the future that court will hold radio defamation to
be libel and not slander.2 9
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin in the case of Singler v.
Journal Co.80 did not find it necessary to decide whether the
alleged defamatory utterances of "racketeer" and "Chicago gang-
ster" would be libel or slander because the jury in the trial court
found that the alleged defamatory statements did not charge the
plaintiff with a crime nor did they expose him to ridicule, and
for that reason were nondefamatory.
When the problem arose in Pennsylvania, the Supreme Court
of that state, held that there was a technical publication of a
libel because the script of the speech had been given to the news-
papers before it was spoken over the radio, even though there
had been no actual publication in the newspapers."1
It would seem, therefore, upon a consideration of the decisions
which have discussed the question, that there is no substantial
accord between the courts as to the essential nature of radio
defamation.
III
The transmission of a radio broadcast usually requires two
parties, the speaker and the broadcaster. If the statements trans-
mitted be defamatory the two must cooperate to create the harm.
The voice of the speaker does not leave the radio station until
transmitted by operations of the station owner or his agents.
All the parties must act in concert to complete the publication. 2
Since the speaker and the broadcaster engage actively in the
publication of defamatory statements, they are both liable as
publishers"2 for the reason that persons instrumental in making
29. Id. at 890, Otis, J. said "There is a close analogy between such a
situation [radio defamation] and the publication in a newspaper of a libel
under circumstances exonerating the publisher of all negligence. The latter
'prints' the libel on paper and broadcasts it to the reading world. The
owner of the radio station 'prints' the libel on a different medium just as
widely or even more widely 'read'."
30. (1935) 218 Wis. 263, 260 N. W. 431.
31. Weglein v. Golder (1935) 317 Pa. 437, 177 Atl. 47.
32. Davis, Radio Law (1927) 162; Sorensen v. Wood (1932) 123 Neb.
348, 243 N. W. 82, 82 A. L. R. 1098; Coffey v. Midland Broadcasting Co.
(D. C. W. D. Mo. 1934) 8 F. Supp. 889, 890.
33. Sorensen v. Wood (1932) 123 Neb. 348, 243 N. W. 82, 82 A. L. R.
1098; Miles v. Wasmer (1933) 172 Wash. 466, 20 P. (2d) 847; Coffey v.
Midland Broadcasting Co. (D. C. W. D. Mo. 1934) 8 F. Supp. 889; Cf.
A. L. I., Torts, Proposed Final Draft No. 3, (1937) 16, states the following
caveat: "The institute expresses no opinion as to whether the proprietors
of a radio broadcasting station are relieved from liability for a defamatory
broadcast by a person not in their employ if they have used reasonable care
to ascertain the character thereof or whether as an original publisher, they
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defamatory publications are liable therefor.3 4 Not only is the
broadcaster liable as a joint tort-feasor, but his liability has been
held to be absolute 5 by the application of the rule that a news-
paper publisher is absolutely liable for the publication of un-
privileged defamatory statements regardless of how careful he
may have been.3 6 Up to the time of the Coffey case,37 radio sta-
tions were absolutely liable for programs originating within
their studios. The Coffey case extended the rule of absolute lia-
bility one step further to include a member of a nation-wide radio
hook-up rebroadcasting a program through telephonic connec-
tions. This liability is not based upon negligence but corresponds
to the liability of one who is required to compensate others for
injuries resulting from his inadequate precautions in regard to
dangerous objects which he has brought upon his premises.38
IV
Just as the courts have resorted to analogies in their attempt
to strengthen their positions as to the absolute liability of radio
stations, so have they employed similar methods to reinforce
their holdings as to the libelous or slanderous character of radio
defamation. While the analogies to newspapers and telegraph
companies have already been exhaustively treated in other arti-
cles, 38 it is interesting to note that Judge Otis, of the federal dis-
trict court, drew the distinction that the broadcasting company
takes the utterances from the wires and publishes them to the
world, whereas the telephone company carries the utterances in
a sealed envelope, as it were, from the sender to a single indivi-
dual .4  He, therefore, held that the telephone analogy was inap-
plicable to radio defamation.
are not liable irrespective of the precautions taken to prevent the defama-
tory publications."
34. Cooley, Torts (4th ed. 1932) 458; Newell, Libel and Slander (4th
ed. 1924) 233; cf. Howland v. Blake Mfg. Co. (1892) 156 Mass. 543, 31
N. W. 656, 657.
35. Sorensen v. Wood (1932) 123 Neb. 348, 234 N. W. 82, 82 A. L. R.
1098.
36. Supra, note 45, Cooley, Torts (4th ed. 1932) 460; Peck v. Tribune Co.
(1909) 214 U. S. 185, 29 S. Ct. 554, 53 L. ed. 960; Sweet v. Post Pub. Co.
(1913) 215 Mass. 450, 102 N. E. 660; Long v. Tribune Printing Co. (1895)
107 Mich. 270, 65 N. W. 108; Corrigan v. Bobbs-Merrill Co. (1920) 228
N. Y. 58, 126 N. E. 260, 10 A. L. R. 662 (book publishers); E. Hulton &
Co. v. Jones (1910) A. C. 20, 79 L. J. K. B. 198, 16 Ann. Cas. 166; Cassidy
v. Daily Mirror Newspapers (1929) 2 K. B. 331, 98 L. J. K. B. 595.
37. (D. C. W. D. Mo. 1934) 8 F. Supp. 889.
38. Cooley, Torts, (4th ed. 1932) 461; Goodhart, Essays In Jurisprudence
And The Common Law (1931) 151.
39. Vold, Defamation By Radio (1934) 19 Minn. L. Rev. 611.
40. Coffey v. Midland Broadcasting Co. (D. C. W. D. Mo. 1934) 8 F.
Supp. 889, 890 "It is he [the radio station owner] who broadcasted the
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A possible analogy which has been ignored by the courts in
determining the nature of radio defamation is that of the "talkie"
motion picture. In the days of the "silent movie," the Appellate
Division of the New York Supreme Court held that, if motion
picture production tended to bring a person into disrepute, it
might give rise to an action in libel.41 Almost two decades later
the same court cited the "silent" picture case in holding that the
"talkie" movie had untold possibilities of producing an effective
libel. The mechanics of the exhibition of the film were analyzed
in order to show that a complaint in a libel action was sufficient
if the defamatory acts were alleged without setting out the actual
words, scenes, and incidents claimed to be libelous. 42
Arriving at the same conclusion independently and at almost
the same time as the New York court, the English Court of
Appeal in the case of Youssoupoff v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer48
held that the defamation constituted libel for the reason that so
far as the photographic part of the film exhibition was concerned
it was a permanent matter to be seen by the eye. The speech
which was synchronized with the photographic reproduction
formed part of one complex common exhibition and was regarded
as an auxiliary circumstance, merely explaining that which was
to be seen.
Thus far all of the cases have held that defamation through
the medium of the "talkie" film is libel.44 Since the broadcast-
ing of sound alone is a transitional stage in the development of
defamation. He took the utterance of the speaker which came to him in
the form of pulsations in the air. Those waves of air he changed into
electrical impulses. Then he threw out upon the ether knowing that they
would be caught up by thousands and changed again into sound waves and
into a human voice"; supra, note 29.
41. Merle v. Sociological Research Film Corp. (1915) 166 App. Div. 376,
152 N. Y. S. 829, 831.
42. Brown v. Paramount Publix Corp. (1934) 240 App. Div. 520, 270
N. Y. S. 544. McNamee, J. (dissenting) "If the language is made the
basis of the libel, the language must be pleaded. If the pictures or other
recorded representation of persons, conduct, places and relations are to be
made the basis of libel, these should be described in sufficient detail to
enable the court to determine that libel has been committed. * * * The
plaintiff has charged only the innuendo, as it were, and has entirely omitted
any allegations of fact, or any description thereof that would justify her
conclusions."
43. Yousoupoff v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures (1934) 99 A. L. R.
864, 875; 50 T. L. R. 581.
44. Supra, note 42 and 43; Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Stanley (Ga.
1937) 192 S. E. 300 held that the petition set forth a good cause of action
for libel in that it sufficiently alleged that the exhibition of a n~iotion picture,
exhibited in connection with the advertisement which stated that the pic-
ture was based on the book, "I Am A Fugitive From A Georgia Chain
Gang," constituted a defamation. The alleged defamation charged his par-
ticipation as a member of the state prison commission of Georgia, in trans-
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radio into television, the "talkie" film cases will, undoubtedly,
have a tremendous effect on the future of the law of radio defa-
mation. Television is the synchronization of sound and sight
effects. The same thing is true of talking motion pictures. On
the basis of the reasoning in the "talkie" cases, defamation by
television will necessarily be libel. The only theory upon which
it might possibly be held to be slander is that the sound effects
are primary and that sight effects which were synchronized with
the sound effects constitute a secondary factor in the one com-
plex exhibition, merely explaining that which was to be heard.
V
Despite the fact that the Sorensen case4 5 and Locke v. Gib-
bons 46 appear to be in conflict as to whether radio defamation
is libel or slander, they can be distinguished on their facts as
well as in their holdings. The Sorensen case holds that the read-
ing of a speech verbatim from a written script over the radio
is libel, whereas Locke v. Gibbons4 7 holds that an extemporaneous
speech, one not following a script, is slander. It is submitted
that such factual distinctions should not be drawn and that the
form in which the defamation originated should be ignored. This
position is taken by Professor Vold who advocates that radio
defamation should at all times, regardless of the facts of the
case, be held libel.4 8 His reasoning is based upon a syllogism,
the minor premise of which is that radio transmission is made
possible through active mechanical operations by the radio sta-
tion which manifestly constitute "conduct," rather than by the
mere words of the speaker. His major premise is that defama-
tion by "conduct" has ordinarily been held to be equivalent to
libel; and his conclusion would seem logically to follow that the
"conduct" of the broadcaster justifies an action for libel. The
major premise of this syllogism, however, might be questioned
because expressions and gestures which undoubtedly are "con-
duct" have often been held to be slander.49
Even though the logic of the Vold position is open to question
it does not follow that radio defamation should be regarded as
ferring a convict who was the author of the book from one chain gang to
another because the convict would not pay the plaintiff a bribe for his
release.
45. Supra, note 26.
46. Supra, note 22.
47. Supra, note 22.
48. Vold, Defamation By Radio (1934) 19 Minn. L. Rev. 611.
49. Leonard v. Allen (1853) 11 Cush. (65 Mass.) 241; Blakeman v.
Blakeman (1884) 31 Minn. 396, 18 N. W. 103; Smith v. Miles (1843) 15
Vt. 62.
NOTES1938]
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slander and not libel. If the underlying reasons for the distinc-
tion between libel and slander are reduced to a fundamental one,50
namely, the extent of the diffusion of the defamatory concepts, 1
it would seem that radio defamation should be solely libel.
The need for a uniform approach to the problem of whether
radio defamation is libel or slander has been partly solved by
statute in some states. California,5 2 Illinois,53 and North Dakota 4
have declared defamatory utterances through the medium of
radio to be slander. It has been defined as libel in Oregon", and
Washington." This type of legislation, however, is no solution
of the problem.
Since defamation by radio resembles both libel and slander in
many respects, it presents the latest and strongest argument that
the distinction between libel and slander be abolished and that
the law of slander be assimilated to that of libel.57 This was
advocated as early as 1812 in the case of Thorley v. Lord Kerry,"s
when Lord Mansfield said
If the matter were for the first time to be decided at this
day, I should have no hesitation in saying, that no action
could be maintained for written scandal which could not be
maintained for the words if they were spoken.
If the operative rules of libel were applied to every form of
defamation, and the fact that the defamation was oral was con-
sidered only in determining the measure of damages, no serious
complaint could be made.5 9 Moreover, it would have the advan-
tage of eliminating the needless refinements and theoretical ab-
surdities of the present law. At the same time, it would furnish
an adequate and efficacious remedy for any damage resulting
from defamation.60  JOSEPH KUTTEN.
50. This is taken to include (1) the greater deliberation in written mat-
ter than in vocal utterances and (2) the permanency of the form of written
matter over oral statements. Utterances which are diffused to the millions
in the radio audience, undoubtedly, should be presumed to show great de-
liberation. Not only that, but the permanency of the written matter is
important only in its preservation of the defamatory matter over a con-
siderable period of time.
51. Supra, notes 19-20.
52. Deering, Penal Code of California (1935) section 258.
53. Ill. Smith-Hurd, Rev. Stat. (1935) ch. 126.
54. N. Dak. Laws, 1929, ch. 117.
55. Ore. Code Ann., 1935 Supp., section 14-238.
56. Wash. Session Laws, 1935, ch. 117.
57. Veeder, History and Theory of the Law of Defamation (1903) 4
Col. Law Rev. 33..
58. 4 Taunt 355,'128 Eng. Rep. 367.
59. 8 Holdsworth, History Of English Laws (1926) 378.
60. Supra, note 57.
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